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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for witness tampering, a third 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2014). 
INTRODUCTION 
After Defendant's friend and boyfriend reported to a police officer 
that Defendant had hit the boyfriend and shoved the friend, the police 
officer cited Defendant for misdemeanor assault. That same day, Defendant 
called the officer and told him that the friend would change her statement. 
But when Defendant asked the friend to lie and report that the boyfriend 
was the assailant, the friend refused. Defendant was charged with witness 
tampering based on that conduct. 
Defendant was acquitted of the assault charge in justice court. She 
was later convicted in district court of third degree felony witness 
tampering. 
------~---------------------------------
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. At trial, Defendant moved for directed verdict on the basis that 
Defendant's friend did not actually change her statement. For the first time 
on appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the verdict because her testimony conflicted with the friend's testimony. 
Defendant also argues that unless the witness tampering statute requires 
more than a verbal request that a witness testify falsely, it is 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
la. Should this court review Defendant's unpreserved claim that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict where she argues no 
exception to the preservation rule? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies. 
lb. Alternatively, was the evidence obviously insufficient to support a 
finding that Defendant attempted to induce or otherwise cause her friend to 
testify or inform falsely? 
Standard of Review. To "establish plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction 
-2-
of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I17, 10 P.3d 346. 
2. the trial court limited evidence of the assault to show Defendant's . 
knowledge of the assault citation. But it also excluded evidence of the 
assault acquittal as irrelevant and instructed the jury not to speculate as to 
the outcome of the assault charge. After trial, Defendant moved for a new 
trial on the ground that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of her 
assault acquittal. She supported her motion with a juror affidavit alleging 
that jurors ignored the trial court's instruction to not consider the outcome 
of the assault citation. The trial court denied the motion. 
2a. Did the trial court exceed its discretion when it excluded evidence 
of Defendant's assault acquittal as irrelevant? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews "a trial court's decision to 
admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Jones, 
2015 UT 19, ~12, 345 P.3d 1195 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
2b. Was Defendant entitled to a new trial where her motion was 
based entirely on an inadmissible juror affidavit? 
-3-
Standard of Review. This Court will not reverse the denial of a new 
trial motion II absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 
,r20, 114 P.3d 551 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
3. Defendant tried to impeach her friend with alleged inconsistencies 
in her assault report. The trial court refused to allow counsel to elicit those 
inconsistencies because they did not relate to the witness tampering charge. 
But the trial court clarified that counsel could impeach the friend with prior 
inconsistent statements relevant to the witness tampering charge. 
Defendant never tried to. 
Did the trial court exceed its discretion by allowing Defendant to offer 
prior inconsistent statements relevant to the witness tampering charge to 
impeach her friend's testimony? 
Standard of Review. See Standard of Review for Issue 2a. 
4. Should this Court review Defendant's challenge to the elements 
instruction where Defendant invited any error by approving it? 
Standard of Review. This Court will not review a jury instruction for 
manifest injustice II if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, if 54, 70 P.3d 111. 
-4-
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
- ~tJ"t-ah-eode-Ann-:-§-'76~8~08-(West 2(:)04};- -- --
Utah R. App. P. 24; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24; 
Utah R. Evid. 103, 401, 402, 403, 404, 606, 801. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Defendant's friend, Ruth Cruz, and Defendant's boyfriend, Josh 
Lister, reported to police that Defendant had assaulted them both. 
R180:120-21, 150-51, 185, 207-08. The two told Officer Charles Triplett that, 
three days earlier, Defendant had hit Lister and shoved Cruz to the ground. 
R180:120-21, 158, 185, 207-08. They each wrote a witness statement to that 
effect. R180:151. 
Officer Triplett interviewed Defendant on her front porch. R180:151-
52, 184; Video 1. Defendant admitted that she had argued with Lister, but 
denied hitting him or shoving Cruz. R180:185; Video 1 at 10:21:20, 10:29:10-
10:30:00. She did admit, however, that she had slapped Lister at least once 
1 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict and conflicting evidence is presented 
only if needed to understand issues raised on appeal. See State v. Kruger, 
2000 UT 60, tjf2, 6 P.3d 1116. 
-5-
in the past. Video 1 at 10:31:10-10:31:40. Based on his opinion that 
Defendant was less credible than Cruz and Lister, Officer Triplett cited 
Defendant for misdemeanor assault. R180:152, 155, 164-65, 186; Video 1 at 
-- 10:29:50.2 . . ----~-~---- --~- ----------
After Officer Triplett left, Defendant called· Cruz and said that she 
wanted to come over. R180:120. When Defendant arrived, she asked Cruz 
to change her police statement. Id. Defendant asked Cruz to "lie to the cop 
and say that she never hit Josh" Lister. Id. She wanted Cruz to instead say 
that "Josh hit her." Id. Although Defendant "kept begging," Cruz refused 
to lie to police. R180:122, 143. 
Sometime that morning, after Officer Triplett returned to the office, 
Defendant called him and said that Cruz wanted to change her statement. 
R180:153, 190. Based on Defendant's call, Officer Triplett went to Cruz's 
house to investigate. R180:153. When he arrived, Defendant and Cruz were 
2 Defendant played excerpts of two dash camera videos to the jury. 
R180:187, 191, 193. Although not introduced as exhibits, both are part of the 
record. The jury heard the entire dash camera video of Detective Triplett' s 
interview with Defendant, except for the sections from 10:23:40 to 10:24 and 
10:30:45 to 10:31. R180:187. The dash camera video of Defendant's arrest 
for witness tampering and post-arrest interview was also played to the jury. 
R180:191, 193. It is not clear what portions of that 40 n1inute tape was 
played, but it appears the jury saw the actual arrest through at least 12:20 
(Defendant's request for a different officer), and a portion of the last part of 
the tape starting at 12:46. Id. For the court's convenience, the State refers to 




both there. R180:122, 153-54, 190. Officer Triplett asked Cruz whether her 
statement was accurate. RlB0:122-23, 153; Video 2 at 12:08:30. Cruz replied, 
"Accurate." Id. At Officer Triplett's request, Cruz repeated her account: 
Defenaant hit. Lister and pushed Cruz, causmg-Ker- to Jall.~Via.eo 2-at 
12:08:55. Cruz then said that Defendant had asked her to lie by saying 
instead that Lister hit Defendant. R180:123, 153; Video 2 at 12:09:15. Based 
on Cruz's explanation, Officer Triplett arrested Defendant for witness 
tampering. R180:154, 190-91; Video 2 at 12:11 :50. 
The defense 
Defendant testified that Cruz met with her after reporting the assault, 
but before Officer Triplett interviewed Defendant. RlB0:188-89. According 
to Defendant, Cruz said that she had gone to. the police station but had 
refused to give a statement. R180:188-89. Defendant testified that Cruz told 
her to call after talking to Officer Triplett. R180:189. 
Defendant testified that she was surprised to learn from Officer 
Triplett that both Lister and Cruz had reported that she hit Lister and 
shoved Cruz. R180:189. As mentioned, Defendant told Officer Triplett that 
she did not assault Lister or Cruz. R180:185-86; Video 1 at 10:21:26, 10:29:40. 
But Defendant admitted on the stand that she had in fact slapped 
Lister. R180:195-96, 199, 201. She claimed that she lied to Officer Triplett 
-7-
because she felt pressured and intimidated by him. RlS0:185-86, 195-96, 
199, 201. Defendant maintained that she did not shove Cruz to the ground. 
R180:185, 199-200. 
Defendant"-said that. after Offfcer Tr-iplett Ieff, ~sne called· Cruz and 
Cruz invited her over. R180:189. According to Defendant, she showed 
Cruz the citation paper and asked why Cruz had lied to Officer Triplett. 
RlS0:189-90, 196. When Cruz asked why there were citations for two 
assaults, Defendant told Cruz that "the officer said that you said that I hit 
you." R180:190. According to Defendant, Cruz said, "that shouldn't be 
there." Id. Cruz said that the citation did not match what she had reported 
and offered to clear things up. R180:196. Defendant testified that she then 
called Officer Triplett because she thought Cruz "could have just made a 
mistake" in her report. R180:190, 197, 199. 
Lister also testified for the defense. R180:203. Lister testified that he 
did not immediately report that Defendant assaulted him because he did 
not want to get police involved. R180:204. But "after hearing rumors" that 
Defendant had been "partying" and was being "young and dumb," he 
changed his mind. RlS0:204, 207. 
Lister and Cruz decided to report the assault so that Defendant 
would be locked up. R180:204, 207. Lister explained that he wanted to keep 
-8-
her "safe" and give her time to "clear her head." Id. But despite admitting 
that he had ulterior motives for reporting the assault, Lister testified that his 
police report was accurate. R180:207-08. 
Defendant was charged with two counts of misdemeanor assault and 
one count of witness tampering, a third degree felony. Rl-2, 27. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-8-508 (West 2004). 
Defendant was acquitted of the assault charges in justice court. R28. 
A jury convicted her of witness tampering in district court. R101. The trial 
court suspended Defendant's zero to five year prison sentence and ordered 
her to serve 30 days in jail and 24 months' probation. R114-15. 
Defendant moved for a new trial and to stay her sentence pending 
appeal. R130, 134-40, 152. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the 
new trial motion, but granted the stay of the remainder of Defendant's 
sentence. R164-66. Defendant timely appealed. R169. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support her conviction because she testified and denied asking Cruz to lie to 
police. Defendant further argues that witness tampering must require more 
-9-
than a mere request that another testify falsely, otherwise the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
First, this Court should not reach Defendant's arguments because 
they are unpreserved - and she -does not argue any exception to th-e~~-- - -----
preservation rule. In any event, it is settled that conflicting evidence does 
not require overturning a jury verdict. Nor can Defendant show that the 
trial court plainly erred in sending the case to the jury because no settled 
precedent adopts the statutory interpretation she advances for the first time 
on appeal. 
Point II(A). Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by not instructing the jury that she had been acquitted of assault. 
But in doing so, Defendant does not challenge the trial court's ruling that 
the fact of the assault would be admissible only to show her knowledge of 
the underlying citation, or that her later acquittal was not relevant to that 
element. Thus, she cannot show the trial court exceeded its discretion. 
Point II(B). Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her 
new trial motion because the exclusion of the assault acquittal prejudiced 
her by allowing the jury to speculate that she had been convicted. But 
Defendant's argument relies entirely on an inadmissible juror affidavit that 






court also limited evidence of the assault to that which was relevant to 
Defendant's knowledge of the citation. And it instructed the jury not to 
speculate on the outcome of the citation. Defendant therefore has not 
- ---~~--,=-::---- -- ----- • -::r· -- --
Sr 1own pre1uu1ce. 
Point III. Defendant argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion 
by not allowing her to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent 
statement. But Defendant's claim is not supported by the record. The trial 
court refused to allow Defendant to impeach the witness with prior 
inconsistencies unrelated to the witness tampering charge. But the trial 
court told Defendant that she could impeach the witness with any relevant 
prior inconsistent statement. Defendant never sought to do so, nor did she 
create a record that the witness had made any prior inconsistent statement. 
Point IV. Defendant finally argues that the elements instruction was 
erroneous because it lacked the required mental state. Defendant is not 
entitled to review, however, because she invited any error in the instruction 
and has not argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for doing so. In 
any event, Defendant could not show that her trial counsel was ineffective 
because the elements instruction tracked the statutory elements, and her 




This Court should not review Defendant's unpreserved 
sufficiency challenges because she raises no exception to the 
preservation rule; alternatively, sufficient evidence supports 
- her conviction. - -- - ~-~---- -·- ------------
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her 
witness tampering conviction. Br.Aplt. 22-30. A person commits witness 
tampering if, "believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, or with the intent to prevent an official 
proceeding or investigation, [she] attempts to induce or otherwise cause 
another person to ... testify or inform falsely." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508(1)(a) (West 2004); R82. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the 
element that she attempted "to induce or otherwise cause" Cruz "to testify 
or inform falsely." Br. Aplt 28. In support, Defendant first argues that the 
evidence was insufficient because her version of events differs from Cruz's. 
Br.Aplt. 24-25. Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient as 
a matter of law because the witness tampering statute must require "some 
action beyond mere words" to avoid being unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad. Br.Aplt. 28-29. 
-12-
{~~) .. 
This Court should not reach Defendant's arguments because she did 
not raise them in the trial court, and she argues no exception to the 
preservation rule. In any event, Defendant's convictions are supported by 
~ -- ample-eviaence and-Defendant has not- shOwri-iliafit would have been 
obvious to the trial court that an attempt to change another's testimony 
must require more than a verbal request to avoid rendering the witness 
tampering statute unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
A. This Court should not consider Defendant's unpreserved 
arguments because she raises no exception to the preservation 
rule. 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on two grounds: 
(1) she denied witness tampering; and (2) an attempt to change testimony 
must require more than a verbal request. See Br.Aplt. 22-30. This Court 
should not consider her arguments because she did not raise them in the 
trial court. Nor does she argue any exception to the preservation rule. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 P.3d 346. To 
preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant must make a specific objection to 
the trial court. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ,I45, 114 P.3d 551. '"This 
specificity requirement arises out of the trial court's need to assess 
allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the context of 
-13-
---------
the specific legal doctrine placed at issue."' State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,r 27, 
128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. 1993)). 
The preservation rule "applies to every claim," including sufficiency-
of-the-evidence challenges. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r,r 11, 16. - "[C]riptic 
and vague" references to the insufficiency of the evidence do not preserve a 
more specific claim for appeal. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,I27. Likewise, a 
broad challenge to "one of the elements of the charge is insufficient to 
preserve for appeal any and every argument that could possibly relate to 
that element." State v. Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89, ,r10, 275 P.3d 1032. And a 
general claim that the State "'presented insufficient evidence to tie [a 
defendant] to the crime"' does not raise a more specific challenge "to 
preserve it for appeal." State v. Meza, 2011 UT App 260, if4, 263 P.3d 424 
(quoting State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ,I14, 54 P.3d 645). 
When a claim is not preserved at trial, a defendant must either argue 
ineffective assistance of counsel or that an exception to the preservation rule 
justifies reaching the unpreserved claim. See, e.g., Pinder, 2005 UT 15, lljf45 
( requiring party seeking review of unpreserved claim "to articulate the 
justification for review in the party's opening brief"). When a defendant 
does not argue ineffective assistance of counsel or an exception to the 
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preservation rule, this Court will not reach her unpreserved claim. See id. 
tjf47. 
At trial, Cruz and Officer Triplett both testified that Defendant asked 
Cruz t0 change her polic::e-statemenrand thafC:ruz refused~---Rl80:122, 153~-
At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved for directed verdict on the 
basis that "there was no change in testimony." R180:168 (the relevant 
transcript pages are reproduced in Addendum B). The trial court explained 
that witness tampering requires only proof of an attempt, i.e., that 
Defendant "tried to induce or cause the other person to testify falsely," not 
that "it actually was successful." Id. Counsel then stated, "All right. Well 
I'll submit that." Id. The court continued, "So if that's the basis, then the 
motion for directed verdict will be denied." RlB0:168-69. Counsel stated, 
"All right." R180:169. 
Defendant did not argue to the trial court that conflicting evidence 
rendered the evidence insufficient. See RlB0:168-69. Nor did she argue that 
a verbal request to testify or inform falsely is insufficient as a matter of law 
to constitute an attempt. See id. Thus, she did not preserve the argument 
that her conflicting account rendered the State's evidence insufficient. 
Br.Aplt. 23-27. Nor did she preserve the argument that the witness 
tampering statute must either require more than "mere words" or be 
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unconstitutionally vague.3 Br.Aplt. 27-29. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, if27 
(holding "cryptic and vague" references to insufficient evidence do not 
preserve specific objection for appeal); Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89, ,r10 
(holding preservation rule requires specific objections); Miza, 201fUT A-pp __ _ 
260, if4 (same). 
For this Court to reach Defendant's claims, therefore, she must show 
either ineffective assistance of counsel or that some exception to the 
preservation rule applies. See Pinder, 2005 UT 15, if 47. Defendant makes no 
such argument. Instead, she argues her claims as though they were 
preserved. See Br.Aplt. 22-30. 
This Court should therefore not consider her arguments. See, e.g., 
Pinder,•. 2005 UT 15, if 47 ( declining to review unpreserved claim where no 
plain error or exceptional circumstances alleged); Winfield, 2006 UT 4, if23 
("Because Winfield argued neither plain error nor exceptional 
3 Defendant arguably invited the alleged error in the court's statutory 
interpretation by affirming, "I'll submit that," when the court said that the 
State need prove only that Defendant "tried to induce" false testimony, not 
L11at the attempt 1--vas successful. R180:168; See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 
if 16 (" Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the 
proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such 
representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without 
further consideration of the issues."). 
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circumstances in his brief on appeal, review is available only if the issue was 
adequately preserved."). 
B. Evidence that Defendant asked a witness to lie to police was 
sufficient to support her witness tampering conviction. 
In any event, Defendant has not shown any deficiency in the evidence 
that she attempted to induce or otherwise cause Cruz to testify or inform 
falsely, let alone an obvious, fundamental deficiency. 
"A defendant must overcome a substantial burden on appeal to show 
that the trial court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict." State v. 
Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, 127, 345 P.3d 1168. When the challenge is preserved, 
this Court upholds a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict 
"'based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence' if, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State, 'some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. (quoting State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 129, 
84 P.3d 1183). 
But, when-as here-the challenge is unpreserved, this Court will 
reverse the trial court's ruling only if the evidence and inferences drawn 
therefrom, viewed Ln a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" and the "evidentiary 
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defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the 
case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, if18 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
Here, the State prod uc-et.fevidence-tha.f(1) Cruz-aria Lister reported to -
Officer Triplett that Defendant shoved Cruz to the ground and hit Lister, 
120-21, 150-51; (2) Officer Triplett cited Defendant for misdemeanor assault, 
R180:152; (3) Defendant called Officer Triplett to report that Cruz wanted to 
change her statement, R180:153; and (4) Defendant asked Cruz "to lie to the 
cop and say that she never hit Josh" Lister. R180:120-21, 153. 
If believed,. this testimony amply supported a finding that Defendant 
believed that "an official proceeding or investigation" was pending and 
attempted "to induce or otherwise cause" Cruz "to testify or inform 
falsely." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1)(a). Thus, there was sufficient 
evidence to support the witness tampering conviction. See Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, ,r1s. 
Defendant nonetheless argues that the evidence was insufficient 
because Defendant's version of events differed from Cruz's. Br.Aplt. 24-25. 
This argument lacks merit. It is well-settled that "contradictory evidence is 
not sufficient to overturn a jury verdict." State v. Mangum, 2013 UT App 
292, if 4, 318 P.3d 250; accord State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1982). This 
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is because "the jury determines which evidence to believe when conflicting 
evidence is presented." Mangum, 2013 UT App 292, if 4; see also State v. Honie, 
2002 UT 4, if44, 57 P.3d 977 ("We do not re-evaluate the credibility of 
---witnesses or- second-guess the jury's conclusion."). 
Thus, because Defendant merely points to conflicting evidence, she 
has not shown any defect in the evidence, let alone an obvious, fundamental 
one. See Holgate, 2000 UT 7 4, 'if 18. 
C. Defendant has not shown that the witness tampering statute 
obviously requires more than a verbal request to lie. 
Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter 
of law because an attempt "to induce or otherwise cause another person to 
... testify or inform falsely" requires more than asking a witness to lie. 
Br.Aplt. 28-29. Rather, according to Defendant, the statute also requires 
some sort of intimidation, bribery, or actual change in testimony.4 Id.; see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508. Defendant asserts that, otherwise, the witness 
4 Defendant's claim is preserved only to the extent that she argues, as 
she did to the trial court, that a defendant cannot be guilty unless she 
actually causes a witness to change her testimony. She has not met her 
burden of persuasion, however, because she cites no authority to support 
this position. Br.Aplt. 28-29; see State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, 'if 20, 345 P.3d 
1226. Nor could she. The plain language of the statute clearly bars the 
"attempt[] to induce" false testimony, not the actual inducement of false 
testimony. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-508. 
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tampering statute would be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
Br.Aplt. 27. 
Defendant cannot meet her burden of persuasion because she has not 
adequately briefed her argument. Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate- · 
Procedure, requires that an argument "contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). This Court may exercise its" discretion to disregard or strike briefs 
that do not comply with rule 24' s substantive requirements." State v. 
Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ,I18, 345 P.3d 1226 (citing Utah R. App. P. 24(k)). And 
"appellants who fail to follow rule 24' s substantive requirements will likely 
fail to persuade the court of the validity of their position." Id. 
As explained, Defendant's argument is unpreserved, yet she does not 
argue that the trial court plainly erred or that trial counsel was ineffective 
for not raising it. That alone is reason to reject her claim. See Pinder, 2005 
UT 15, if 47. In any event, because her challenge is unpreserved, Defendant 
must demonstrate that any "error should have been obvious to the trial 
court." See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, if16, 95 P.3d 276. This requires 
demonstrating that "the law governing the error was clear at the time the 
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alleged error was made." Id. In other words, "an error is not obvious if 
'there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."' State v. Davis, 
2013 UT App 228, if 53, 311 P.3d 538 (quoting State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 
. (Utah App. 1997)). 
Defendant has not met her burden of persuasion to show error - let 
alone plain error-because she cites no controlling authority to support her 
argument that to be constitutional, a prohibition on an attempt to induce or 
otherwise cause another person to testify or inform falsely must require 
"some action beyond mere words," particularly where the attempt is 
unsuccessful. Br.Aplt. 28-29. 
To prevail on a vagueness challenge, Defendant must show either (1) 
that the statute did not provide "the kind of notice that enables ordinary 
people to understand what conduct [is prohibited]," or (2) that the statute 
encouraged "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. MacGuire, 
2004 UT 4, ,I13, 84 P.3d 1171 (quotation marks and citation omitted). To 
show that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, she must demonstrate 
that it "prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech." Buscho v. 
Shurtleff, 729 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
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Defendant cites no precedent requiring that witness tampering be 
more than mere words or be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Nor 
could she where the Utah Supreme Court has held that the witness 
tampering statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to purely 
verbal conduct because "use of the word 'induce' in the statute clearly 
indicates that it applies to verbal as well as physical interference with a 
witness." State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1981).5 And a federal 
court upheld the statute despite an overbreadth claim because "the 
compelling interest of the state in preserving the integrity and fairness of its 
judicial system outweighs whatever first amendment interest the petitioner 
may have in this case." Carlsen v. Morris, 556 F.Supp. 320, 322 (D. Utah 
1982). 
Defendant does not acknowledge this precedent or attempt to 
distinguish it. Instead, Defendant bases her argument on a purported 
definition of "to tamper." Br.Aplt. 28 ( definition without citation). 
5 Carlsen interpreted a prior version of the statute. But subsequent 
statutory amendments do not alter its reasoning on this point. See 2004 
Utah Laws Ch. 140 (adding "intent to prevent an official proceeding" 
elen·1ent and non-merger provision, deleting and recodifying retaliation 
provision); 2000 Utah Laws Ch. 1, section 115 (inserting "or" between 
document and item in subsection (l)(b)); 1988 Utah laws Ch. 175 (stylistic 
amendments to witness tampering provisions, substantive amendments to 
other parts of statute). 
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Defendant then cites State v. Geukgeuzian (Geukgeuzian I), 2002 UT App 130, 
54 P.3d 640, rev' d 2004 UT 16, a court of appeals case that was overturned by 
the Utah Supreme Court. See Br.Aplt. 29. Even if Geukgeuzian I had not 
been overturned, it is inapposite because it did not involve a sufficiency 
challenge, nor did it hold that witness tampering requires more than asking 
a witness to lie. See 2002 UT App 130, passim. 
Finally, Defendant appears to argue that the mental state for 
tampering with a witness is incompatible with the mental state for soliciting 
a bribe. Br.Aplt. 28. But the statute differentiates the two provisions as 
separate crimes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(3) ("The offense of 
tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe ... ") (emphasis 
added). Defendant makes no attempt to explain why it should have been 
plain to the trial court that the two crimes should have the same mental 
state. She therefore has not met her burden of persuasion. See Roberts, 2015 
UT 24, ,118 ("[A]ppellants who fail to follow rule 24's substantive 
requirements will likely fail to persuade the court of the validity of their 
position."). 
In sum, Defendant cites no settled precedent to support her argument 
that a verbal attempt to influence a witness to testify or inform falsely is 
insufficient as a matter of law to support a witness tampering conviction. 
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She therefore has not shown any obvious, fundamental defect in the 
evidence. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I18. 
II. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
Defendant's assault acquittal. 6 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding as irrelevant the fact that she was ultimately acquitted of assault. 
Br.Aplt. 30-31 .. Defendant further argues that although the trial court issued 
an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of the evidence of the 
assault, the instruction was inadequate because, without knowing that she 
was acquitted of the assault, the jury was left to speculate as to the outcome 
of the assault citation. Br.Aplt. 32. Defendant also challenges the trial 
court's denial of her new trial motion in which she raised these issues. 
Br.Aplt. 34-35, 37, 40-41. 
Defendant's arguments lack merit because the trial court properly 
admitted evidence of the assault only for a limited purpose: to show 
Defendant's knowledge of an official proceeding or investigation. R180:98-
99. And it instructed the jury not to speculate about the outcome of the 
assault citation because it was relevant only for context. R180:101, 216-17; 
6 This argument responds to Defendant's point B, pages 37-39 of her 
point C, and her point D. 
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R84. In any event, Defendant cannot show prejudice. Defendant argues 
that she was prejudiced because the jury was left to speculate about the 
outcome of the assault citation. Br.Aplt. 34-35, 38-39, 40-41. But, as 
explained, the trial court expressly instructed the jury not to do so. 
Moreover, any impression that Defendant had been convicted of the assault 
would have arisen only because of evidence that Defendant introduced. 
A. The trial court did not err in its pretrial ruling that the fact of 
Defendant's assault acquittal was not relevant and would be 
unduly prejudicial to the State. 
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding evidence of the assault acquittal. Br.Aplt. 31, 38-39. Defendant 
challenges the trial court's pre-trial ruling excluding the acquittal as 
irrelevant, and argues that the limiting instruction was inadequate because 
it did not state that she had been acquitted of assault. Br.Aplt. 30-32, 38-39. 
As a result, Defendant claims that she was prejudiced and is therefore 
entitled to a new trial. Br.Aplt. 40-41. 
1. The trial court properly admitted assault evidence to show 
only Defendant's knowledge of an official proceeding. 
Before trial, Defendant moved to exclude evidence related to the 
assault charge under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. R24-31. 
Alternatively, Defendant argued that if the evidence were admitted, the 
court should instruct the jury that evidence could only "be considered as 
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background for context because the Defendant was acquitted of the 
underlying assault." R29. Counsel provided the trial court with such an 
instruction. R54 (reproduced in Addendum D). 
The trial court denied the motion. R180:98-99 (the relevant transcript 
pages are reproduced in Addendum C). It ruled that evidence of the assault 
was relevant only to establish the element of Defendant's "knowledge of an 
official proceeding being pending." R180:99. The trial court therefore 
admitted evidence of the assault for only a very limited purpose: to show 
that there was "a confrontation or a fight of some nature," which resulted in 
a citation issued to Defendant. 7 Id. 
The trial court also ruled that it would not admit evidence of the 
assault acquittal unless "the State presents evidence that would make that 
appropriate." R180:98-99. The court explained that the ultimate outcome of 
the assault citation was irrelevant to the limited purpose for which the 
assault evidence was admissible. Id. And the acquittal "would unduly 
prejudice the jury and so we need to limit what's going to go on." R180:99. 
The trial court emphasized that it also would not find an assault conviction 
relevant, if that had been the outcome of the assault citation. Id. 
7 The hearing appears to be a continuation of an in-chambers 
conference. The record includes no transcript of that conference. 
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The trial court therefore ruled that it would instruct the jury "not to 
consider the circumstances that resulted in that citation" or "speculate about 
what the result of that was because that's all irrelevant." Id. Defense 
counsel asked the court to also admonish the jury not to "speculate in terms 
of the result of that citation" because Defendant's guilt or innocence of 
assault "is not before this jury to consider." R180:101. The trial court asked 
if counsel agreed to an additional instruction that "they may only consider 
[the assault evidence] in addressing one element of the offense; and that is 
whether or not she had knowledge of an official proceeding pending?" 
Counsel answered, "if the Court gives that admonition as the evidence 
comes in that will suffice." Id. Counsel further stated that he had no 
objection to the introduction of the citation as an exhibit. Id. 
The discussion of the final jury instructions was in-chambers, and no 
transcript was included with the record. R180:213. Counsel stated on the 
record that he had no objection to the jury instructions. Id. The jury was 
instructed that Defendant's alleged prior acts were offered only for "context 
and explanation of the circumstances which gave rise to the pending 
charge." R180:216-17; R84. The jury was further instructed not to 
"speculate about what resulted from that initial citation." Id. (the relevant 
jury instructions are reproduced in Addendum E). 
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2. The trial court was within its discretion to exclude the fact 
of the assault acquittal because it was not relevant. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's pretrial exclusion of evidence of 
her assault acquittal. In doing so, Defendant does not challenge the trial 
court's ruling that evidence of the prior assault was admissible for the 
limited purpose of showing her knowledge of an official proceeding or-
investigation. Instead, she argues broadly that the assault acquittal was also 
relevant and that the trial court erred in not conducting a rule 404 analysis 
before excluding it. Br.Aplt. 30-31. 
This argument misinterprets the trial court's ruling. Under 
Defendant's pre-trial motion, the trial court admitted evidence of the assault 
only for a very limited purpose: to show Defendant's knowledge of the 
citation on the date of the charged conduct. RlB0:98-99. The trial court 
ruled that the ultimate outcome of the citation was irrelevant to Defendant's 
state of mind at the time. Id. It gave a limiting instruction to that effect. 
R84. Defendant has not shown that this ruling was an abuse of discretion. 
Because '"trial courts have wide discretion in determining relevance, 
probative value, and prejudice,"' this Court generally .,"will not reverse the 
trial court's ruling on evidentiary issues urJess it is maPifest that ti11e trial 
court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice 
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resulted."' State v. Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, ,r 7, 141 P.3d 614 (quoting State 
v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, ,I12, 63 P.3d 72). 
Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. Relevant 
evidence is presumed admissible, but irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 
See Utah R. Evid. 402. Although the relevance test is a "low" bar, evidence 
must have at least some "probative value to a fact at issue" to be admissible. 
See State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ,I13, 973 P.2d 404. 
Here, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in excluding the 
assault acquittal because that fact was irrelevant to the narrow issue before 
the jury. The ultimate outcome of the citation had no tendency to make it 
more or less likely that Defendant believed she was the subject of an official 
investigation on the day that she was cited for assault. See, e.g., Bee v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, ,I17, 204 P.3d 204 (holding prior 
advertisements that did not mention dangers of alcohol were not relevant to 
whether it was negligent to allow an intoxicated person to participate in 
contest). Thus, the evidence of the assault acquittal was irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible. See Utah R. Evid. 401, 402. At the same time, even if 
the acquittal had some limited relevance, admitting evidence of the 
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acquittal risked misleading the jury, confusing the issues and unfairly 
prejudicing the State by creating the potential of re-trying Defendant for 
assault. See Utah R. Evid. 403. Thus, even if · there were some slight 
probative value to the assault acquittal, the trial court did not exceed its 
discretion by excluding it under rule 403. 
Defendant nonetheless argues that her acquittal should have been 
admitted because it was relevant to "the circumstances surrounding the 
instant crime." See Br.Aplt. 30-31. But Defendant cannot meet her burden 
of persuasion because she does not acknowledge the trial court's relevance 
ruling or explain how her later acquittal was relevant to her state of mind 
on the date of the charged conduct. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (1'The 
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on."). This Court should therefore exercise its 
"discretion to disregard or strike" this portion of Defendant's brief because 
it "does not comply with rule 24' s substantive requirements." Roberts, 2015 
UT 24, iJ18 (citing Utah R. App. P. 24 (k)). 
Instead, Defendant cites two cases to support the proposition that 
evidence is relevant even though it may connect a defendant to another 
crime. Br.Aplt. 31. But, as explained, the trial court excluded the acquittal 
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because it was irrelevant to the limited purpose for which the assault 
evidence was admitted, not because it connected Defendant to a different 
crime. Thus Defendant's cases are inapposite. See State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 
880, 882 (Utah 1978) (in car theft trial, evidence that Daniels siphoned gas 
"was relevant to his story that he did not have very much money on him 
and that without money he could think of no other way to get to California 
other than by stealing a car"); State v. State v. Tibbets, 2012 UT App 95, ,I 6, 
275 P.3d 1047 (in burglary trial, "evidence that pain medicine had recently 
disappeared from the victim's drawer helped explain the testimony ... that 
[Tibbets] entered the home and proceeded directly to the drawer wherein 
the pain medicine was kept"). Defendant makes no effort to explain why 
her later acquittal should have been relevant to whether she believed an 
investigation was pending on the day the citation was issued. She therefore 
has not shown that the trial court's exclusion of the acquittal was an abuse 
of discretion. 
To the extent that Defendant argues that the acquittal was needed to 
alleviate prejudice from 404(b) evidence, her claim lacks merit. Her case is 
unlike those in which a prior acquittal is offered to discredit a witness 
testifying about conduct similar to the charged conduct, such as where a 
witness testifies that the defendant victimized her in a similar way. Cf State 
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v. Denos, 2013 UT App 192, 'if24, 319 P.3d 699 ("[T]he strength of B.E.'s 
testimony was undermined by the fact that Denos had been acquitted of 
raping her ... though any prejudice was mitigated by the fact that the jury 
was informed of the acquittal."). As explained, the assault evidence was 
admitted only for the limited purpose of showing one element-
Defendant's belief that an official proceeding or investigation was pendmg. 
Evidence that she was later acquitted had no relevance to her knowledge of 
the citation on the date of the alleged conduct. 
In sum, Defendant has not shown that the trial court's exclusion of 
the assault acquittal was an abuse of discretion. 
B. The trial court did not exceed its discretion in denying 
Defendant's new trial motion because that motion relied solely 
on an inadmissible juror affidavit. 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying her new 
trial motion because she was prejudiced by the exclusion of her assault 
acquittal, as evidenced by a juror affidavit. Br.Aplt. 39-40. Defendant 
asserts that some jurors believed that she was convicted of assault and 
therefore evidence of the acquittal was necessary to correct that belief. 
Br.Aplt. 32, 34-35, 38-41. Defendant argues that without knowing of the 
acquittal, the jury was left "to speculate about whether or not she had been 
convicted" and thus inferred "that she had been convicted." Br.Aplt. 32. 
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A trial court may "grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is 
any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of a party." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). 
As will be explained below, Defendant has not shown that she was 
entitled to a new trial because the trial court issued a limiting instruction 
and her prejudice argument relies entirely on an inadmissible juror 
affidavit. 
1. Defendant moved for a new trial based on the exclusion of 
the assault acquittal. 
After trial, Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that she had 
been prejudiced by the failure to inform the jury of the assault acquittal. 
R134-40. In support, she presented a juror affidavit stating that in the 
juror's opinion, the verdict resulted from "inaccurate assumptions as to 
Miss Plexico's guilt on the underlying charges and past criminal history, ... 
undue influence and factors we, as jurors, considered outside the scope of 
our instruction and the evidence presented at trial." R144 (the affidavit is 
reproduced in Addendum F). The juror added that although instructed not 
to do so, jurors debated whether Defendant had committed the assault and 
some reached the conclusion that she had. R145. The juror believed that at 
least one juror drew an inference from the evidence that Defendant had a 
prior criminal history. Id. The juror further insinuated that the foreperson' s 
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background in criminology enabled her to unduly influence other jurors to 
accept her theory of guilt. R146. 
At a hearing on the motion, Defendant argued that the juror affidavit 
showed that she was prejudiced by the exclusion of her acquittal because 
without that fact in evidence, the jurors drew the incorrect inferences that 
she had been convicted and had a prior criminal history. R181:5-7. She 
further argued that the foreperson exercised undue influence on jurors. Id. 
The State argued that the court could only review whether the jury was 
instructed properly, not whether the jury actually followed those 
instructions. R181:3-4, 8. Neither party directly addressed the admissibility 
of the juror's affidavit under rule 606, Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. The trial 
court denied the motion without explanation. R181:10. 
2. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for new 
trial because the motion relied entirely on an inadmissible 
juror affidavit. 
Relying on the juror affidavit, Defendant argues that despite the 
limiting instruction, the jurors were left to speculate about the outcome of 
the assault citation. This claim lacks merit because "a jury is presumed 
to ... follow its instructions." Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 226 (2000); 
accord State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ,r 62, 309 P.3d 1160. Here, the jury 
was specifically instruct not to "speculate about what resulted from that 
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initial citation." R84 (reproduced in Addendum E). More importantly, 
Defendant cannot establish prejudice based on the juror affidavit alleging 
that some jurors may have ignored the limiting instruction because that 
affidavit is inadmissible. 
In a challenge to the validity of a verdict, jurors' testimony is 
prohibited unless it goes to whether "extraneous prejudicial information 
was brought to the jury's attention" or "an outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear on any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). 
Rule 606, Utah Rules of Evidence, "prohibits 'virtually all inquiries 
into the jury deliberation process"' in a challenge to the validity of a verdict. 
Jessop v. Hardman, 2014 UT App 28, ,I25, 319 P.3d 790 (quoting State v. 
Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 59, ,I33, 167 P.3d 1038). It generally bars the court 
from considering a juror's testimony or affidavit related to "any statement 
made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of 
anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental 
processes concerning the verdict or indictment." Utah R. Evid. 606(b)(l). 
In other words, the rule treats the jury as "a black box: the inputs ( evidence 
and argument) are carefully regulated by law and the output (the verdict) is 
publicly announced, but the inner workings and deliberation of the jury are 
deliberately insulated from subsequent review." U.S. v. Benally, 546 F.3d 
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1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008); accord State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 1113, 299 P.3d 
892 ( citations omitted). 8 
The rule contains two exceptions: a "juror may testify about whether: 
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention; or (B) an outside influence was brought to bear on any juror." 
Utah R. Evid. 606(b)(2). 
The exceptions are limited- they allow only testimony as to 
extraneous information or influences, i.e. information that "derives from a 
source 'external' to the jury.'' Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) 
(citation omitted). "'External' matters include publicity and information 
related specifically to the case the jurors are meant to decide." Id. (citations 
omitted). But they do not include '"internal' matters" such as "the general 
body of experiences that jurors are understood to bring with them to the 
jury room." Id. (citations omitted). 
Thus a juror could testify to '"misconduct such as jurors reading news 
reports about the case, jurors communicating with third parties, bribes, and 
jury tampering.111 Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if114 (quoting Benally, 546 F.3d at 
8 Because Utah's rule is hitended to mirror "the federal rule 
verbatim," the State cites federal authority as persuasive. See Utah R. 606 
Advisory Committee Note and 2011 Advisory Committee Note; see also 
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 11113-118 & n.123 (noting federal and state rules 
mirror each other and citing federal authority). 
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1236). A juror could also testify about "the jury's consideration of evidence 
not admitted in court, and instances where a juror 'conduct[ed] his own 
investigation and [brought] the results into the jury room."' Id. (alterations 
in original) (quoting Benally, 546 F.3d at 1237). 
But the "exceptions do not extend to discussions among jurors, 
intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, [or] other intra-jury 
influences on the verdict." Benally, 546 F.3d at 1237 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Thus, "evidence of discussions among jurors" or a juror's 
bringing her "personal experiences to bear on the matter at hand" are 
inadmissible. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, il114 (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
The rule is restrictive for a reason-it protects the constitutional 
guarantee of a trial by jury by preventing judges' second-guessing of 
verdicts. See Benally, 546 F.3d at 1237 (quoting Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 
581 (5th Cir. 1982)). Although the rule "denies the court access to what may 
be relevant information ... that might, for example, justify a motion for a 
new trial," it also ensures that "jurors [may] express themselves candidly 
and vigorously as they discuss the evidence presented in court." Maestas, 
2012 UT 46, if113 (omission and alteration in original) (quoting Benally, 546 
F.3d at 1237). 
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Defendant cannot meet her burden of persuasion here because the 
affidavit on which she relies relates only to issues internal to the 
deliberative process-allegations of improper inferences drawn from the 
evidence. See R143-49. The affidavit complains that despite the trial court's 
instruction not to do so, jurors speculated that Defendant was guilty of the 
assault, and that at least one juror speculated that Defendant had a prior 
criminal history. See id. But the affidavit points to no "extraneous 
prejudicial information" that was "improperly brought to the jury's 
attention." See Utah R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(A). 
The affidavit further alleges that the juror felt unduly pressured by 
the foreperson. See R146-47. Again, that allegation does not involve any 
improper outside influence. See Utah R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(B). 
The affidavit is therefore inadmissible because it concerns only 
allegations of internal influences that are not subject to judicial review. See 
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I114; see also Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 (stating rule 606 
does not allow testimony to internal matters such as "the general body of 
experiences that jurors are understood to bring with them to the jury 
room"); Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2006) (The "Sixth 
Amendment's guarantees do not require judicial consideration of juror 
allegations regarding influences internal to the deliberation process."); 
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Taylor v. State, 2012 UT 5, ,131, 270 P.3d 471 (distinguishing "extrinsic 
evidence" from "intra-jury influences relating to ... ~e mental process of 
an individual juror during deliberations"). 
But even if the jurors' inferences from the evidence could be 
considered "extraneous," this Court could consider only the fact that the 
evidence was brought to the jury's attention, not whether jurors considered 
it. See, e.g., State v. Kovalevich, 2015 ND 11, if22, 858 N.W.2d 625 (" Any juror 
testimony resulting from Kovalevich's inquiry would only demonstrate 
how the jury arrived at its decision and the effect of the alleged misconduct 
on the jury, which is evidence or testimony that is prohibited."). 
Because Defendant's prejudice argument relies solely on an 
inadmissible affidavit, she cannot meet her burden of persuasion to show 
that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying her new trial motion. 
3. Defendant introduced the bulk of the evidence leading to 
any alleged improper inference. 
Finally, to the extent that jurors could have drawn the conclusion 
from the trial evidence that Defendant had been convicted of assault, 
Defendant cannot complain. Defendant introduced the bulk of the evidence 
so, it still would not admit evidence of the acquittal. See State v. Barney, 681 
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P.2d 1230, 1231 (Utah 1984) (holding defendant invited error by eliciting the 
challenged evidence on cross). 
As explained, the trial court limited the assault evidence to only that 
necessary to show Defendant's knowledge of an official proceeding or 
investigation. R180:98-99. When defense counsel indicated he may 
introduce dash camera videos, the trial court cautioned: "you do run the 
risk" of getting "into areas that I've indicated that I'm not going to allow the 
State to get into that you, then, have waived any objection." R180:102. 
Counsel stated, "I understand." Id. 
Keeping with the pretrial ruling, the State limited its examination of 
Cruz about the assault. Cruz testified that she reported a fight in which 
Defendant hit Lister. R180:120-21. Cruz also said that Defendant then 
asked her to "lie to the cop and say that" Defendant did not hit Lister, but 
rather that Lister "hit her." R180:120. When Defendant sought to impeach 
Cruz, the trial court cautioned that it would not admit the fact of the 
acquittal even if Defendant introduced evidence about the assault. 
R180:141. Officer Triplett then testified that after interviewing all three 
witnesses, he cited Defendant for assault because he found her less credible 
than Lister and Cruz. R180:152, 163-64. 
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The bulk of the evidence about the assault was introduced by 
Defendant on cross-examination and in her case-in-chief: 
• On cross, Defendant elicited that, in her initial police report, Cruz 
omitted the fact that a gun was involved. R180:134. 
• On cross, Defendant elicited from Officer Triplett that one of the 
reasons he found Cruz and Lister credible was that Lister's mother 
reported a history of Defendant abusing Lister. R180:158. 
• Defendant introduced the dash camera video of Officer Triplett's 
interview of her, in which Defendant denied the assault, but admitted 
that she had fought with Lister and had slapped him in the past. 
R180:187; Video 1 passim. In the video, Defendant claimed that Lister 
had threatened himself with a gun. Video at 10:23:05-10:23:40. 
~ Defendant introduced the dash camera video of her arrest and post-
arrest interview. R180:191; Video 2 passim. 
• Lister testified for the defense that he reported the assault only to get 
Defendant arrested. RlS0:204, 207. But he also testified that his police 
report was accurate. R180:207-08. 
• Defendant admitted that she lied to Officer Triplett and that she had 
actually slapped Lister. R180:195-96, 199,201. 
Thus, to the extent that the evidence at trial suggested that Defendant 
was guilty of assault, Defendant cannot complain because she introduced 
the bulk of that evidence. See Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493, 
,I29, 128 P.3d 47 (introducing police report into evidence and then not 
objecting when officer read fro1n report invited any error in admitting the 
report). Defendant therefore has not shown that she was prejudiced by the 
exclusion of her assault acquittal. 
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III. 
The trial court did not prevent Defendant from impeaching a 
witness with a prior inconsistent statement.9 
Defendant next complains that the trial court abused its discretion by 
not allowing her to impeach Cruz with a prior inconsistent statement that 
she allegedly made at the assault trial. 10 Br.Aplt. 32-33. Defendant's 
argument is not supported by the record because the trial court ruled that 
counsel could impeach Cruz with any prior testimony that contradicted her 
trial testimony. See R180:140. Defendant did not thereafter attempt to 
impeach Cruz or make a record of a prior inconsistent statement by her. 
A. The trial court did not exclude any prior inconsistent 
statement and Defendant made no record of one. 
While cross-examining Cruz, counsel elicited that her police 
statement about the assault omitted the fact that a gun was involved. 
9 This point responds to pages 32-34 of Defendant's Point B. 
10 Defendant also references rule 608's modes for impeaching a 
witness's character for untruthfulness through opinion evidence, specific 
instances of conduct, or evidence of bias, but Defendant did not make a rule 
608 argument to the trial court and does not argue plain error. See Br.Aplt. 
32-33. Thus, this Court should not consider her rule 608 argument. See State 
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ( declining review of 
unpreserved issue where defendant does not argue plain error or 
exceptional circu1nstances). In any event, Defendant cannot 111eet her 
burden of persuasion because she makes no argument as to why this rule 
applies. This Court should therefore exercise its discretion to not consider 
Defendant's rule 608 argument. See Utah R. App. P. 24(k) (this Court may 
disregard or strike noncom pliant briefs). 
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R180:133-34. When counsel probed further, the State objected. R180:134 
The trial court sustained the objection, explaining that the statements 
Defendant was trying to introduce were irrelevant to the witness tampering 
charge. R180:134-35. Defense counsel stated that he wanted to make a 
record. R180:135 (the transcript of the proceedings are reproduced in 
Addendum G). 
But instead, counsel argued that testimony from the assault trial 
indicated that Cruz and Lister "were abusing the process." R180:137. The 
trial court stated that the_jury would not be asked to decide whether Cruz 
testified falsely at the assault trial, but that counsel could argue that 
Defendant talked to Cruz to get her to tell the truth. R180:137-38. At the 
same time, the court cautioned that if Defendant admitted additional assault 
evidence, it still would not allow in the fact of the acquittal. Id. 
Counsel clarified that he was "not interested in what conclusion came 
out of that trial," but that Cruz's "testimony may be inconsistent with what 
she testified to" at the assault trial. R180:140. The court ruled, "You can 
offer that and once we open that door ... because I determine that it's 
somehow relevant to what your client told her, then I think we can probably 
get into that testimony." Id. 
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Counsel then stated that he would complete his cross-examination 
and reserve the right to recall Cruz. RlS0:140-41. But Defendant did not 
thereafter seek to impeach Cruz with a prior inconsistent statement, nor did 
he later recall her. RlS0:143-45, 147-49. 
B. Defendant cannot prove the trial court exceeded its 
discretion because it invited Defendant to impeach Cruz 
with a prior inconsistent statement. 
Defendant argues that the trial court "drew the wrong conclusions by 
not applying proper analysis" when it excluded the assault trial 
proceedings. Br.Aplt. 33. Defendant asserts that the trial court's ruling 
denied him the ability to impeach Cruz with a prior inconsistent statement. 
Br.A pit. 32-33. Defendant's argument lacks merit because the trial court 
ruled that he could impeach Cruz with her prior inconsistent statements. 
R180:140. 
A declarant' s prior statement is not hearsay if "it is inconsistent with 
the declarant's testimony or the declarant denies having made the statement 
or has forgotten." Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(A). The rule applies only to 
statements inconsistent with a witness's trial testimony. See id. Thus, a 
witness may not be impeached with a prior statement where she "had 
neither been asked nor had she volunteered anything at all about" the prior 
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statement during her trial testimony. State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1265 
(Utah 1983) (interpreting prior version of rule). 
The record here does not support Defendant's argument that the trial 
court prevented her from impeaching Cruz with prior inconsistent 
testimony. Instead, the trial court told Defendant that she could offer 
evidence that Cruz's previous testimony was inconsistent with her trial 
testimony. R180:140. But Defendant never did so. Nor did Defendant 
make a record of any prior inconsistent statement that he wished to 
impeach her with. See Utah. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) (stating preservation requires 
informing the court of the "substance by an offer of proof, unless the 
substance was apparent from the context"). 
Therefore, Defendant's argument is not supported by the record, and 
she cannot show that the trial court exceeded its discretion. 
IV. 
Defendant invited any error in the elements instruction. 
Defendant next argues that the elements instruction was plainly 
erroneous because it lacked the required mental state for witness tampering. 
Br.Aplt. 35-39. Defendant, however, does not clearly explain what makes 
the elements instruction piainly erroneous. See Br.Aplt. 35-37. Nor is 
Defendant entitled to plain error review because she invited any error in the 
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elements instruction when she told the trial court that she had no objections 
to the instructions. R180:213. 
A party who does not object to an instruction may argue that the 
instruction constitutes manifest injustice under rule 19(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. However, "a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error." State v. Geukgeuzian (Geukgeuzian II), 2004 UT 16, if9, 86 P.3d 742 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The invited error rule prevents a party from taking "advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing 
the error." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, if54, 70 P.3d 111 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "affirmatively indicating that" 
counsel has "no objections to the instructions" invites any error in those 
instructions. Id. iJ55; accord State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, if 12, 236 P.3d 
155. 
"Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be assigned as error even if 
such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, either by 
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no 
objection to the jury instruction."' Geukgeuzian II, 2004 UT 16, if9 (quoting 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, if54). A defendant who invites a trial court's error 
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may obtain relief only by showing that trial counsel was ineffective. See, 
e.g., State v. Beckering, 2015 UT App 53, ,I20, 346 P.3d 672. 
Defendant argues that she did not invite any error m the jury 
instructions because she did not propose erroneous instructions. Br.Aplt. 
36-37. But, as explained, a party invites any error in a jury instruction by 
affirmatively approving it. See, e.g., Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,I55. 
Here, counsel stated on the record that he had no objection to the jury 
instructions. R180:213. Review of Defendant's plain error challenge to the 
elements instruction is therefore precluded by the invited error doctrine. 
See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,I55. That conclusion should end this Court's 
review of this issue because Defendant does not argue that trial counsel was 
ineffective in handling the elements instruction. See Beckering, 2015 UT App 
533, if 35 ( declining to conduct ineffective assistance "analysis on 
Beckering' s behalf" where error was invited and no ineffectiveness claim 
was raised). 
But even if Defendant had raised a claim of ineffective assistance, she 
could not prevail. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant 
must prove both that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable 
and that she was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). When reviewing counsel's performance, "a court must 
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indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. If "a rational basis 
for counsel's performance can be articulated, [the reviewing court] will 
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 43, 328 
P.3d 841 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
First, it was objectively reasonable for trial counsel to approve the 
instruction because the instruction tracked the statutory language and it can 
be read to include a mental state. 
The crime of witness tampering is defined by Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-
508 (West 2004): 
(1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of 
tampering with a witness if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, 
or with the intent to prevent an official proceeding or 
investigation, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause another 
person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; ... 
Instruction 11 tracked those elements: 
Before you may find Defendant SHONI PLEXICO guilty of 
the offense of: TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as charged in 
the information, the State must prove and you must find, 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every 
one of the following elements: 
1. That Defendant, SHONI PLEXICO, believing that an official 




instituted, or with the intent to prevent an official 
proceeding or investigation; 
2. That the Defendant did attempt to induce or otherwise 
casue another person to 
3. Testify or inform falsely; 
4. That such events occurred on or about August 17, 2013, in 
Iron County, State of Utah. 
R82 (Addendum E); R180:215-16. 
Defendant argues that the instruction was plainly erroneous because 
it does not specify the required mental state. Br.Aplt. 36. Here, counsel 
might reasonably have assumed that Instruction 11 was unobjectionable 
because it tracked the statutory elements. Instructions that mirror the 
language of the controlling statute generally are upheld on appeal. See, 
e.g., State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1981) ("If an instruction is 
supported by the evidence and its meaning is clear, an instruction in the 
form of statutory language is not improper."); State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 
42, ~19, 321 P.3d 235 (no error in accomplice liability instruction that 
"quoted the applicable statutory provision verbatim" along with 
"instruction outlining elements of robbery, including requisite intent"). 
Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that the instruction 
correctly identified the mental state because one element mentioned in the 
instruction did relate to Defendant's state of mind. Like the statute on 
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which it is patterned, Instruction 11 specifies that to be guilty the defendant 
must have either acted "believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, or with the intent to 
prevent an official proceeding or investigation." R82. This requirement 
could be viewed as the mental state of the crime. In fact, in construing a 
tampering statute materially identical to the Utah statute, the Colorado 
Court of Appeals referred to "actual belief that some governmental 
proceeding has been or is about to be commenced" as the crime's "mental 
state." People v. Frayer, 661 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). And in 
construing the receiving-stolen-property statute, the Utah Supreme Court 
referred to the element of "believing that [the property] probably has been 
stolen" as the "mens rea." State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1985). 
Nonetheless, Defendant relies on Geukgeuzian I to argue that it should 
have been obvious that the elements instruction did not but should have 
included the mental state. Br.Aplt. 35-37. In Geukgeuzian I, this Court ruled 
that the requisite mental state for witness tampering was intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly. See 2002 UT App 130, 1iJ8-9 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-102). That decision was reversed, however, because 
Geukgeuzian invited any error in his elements instruction. See Geukgeuzian 




was ineffective and affirmed Geukgeuzian' s conviction for lack of prejudice . 
See State v. Geukgeuzian (Geukgeuzian III), 2005 UT App 228U. Thus, there 
was no controlling case law to alert counsel to any requirement that the 
elements instruction here include intentional, knowing, or reckless mental 
states. And even if those mental states were necessary, a separate 
instruction told the jury that it could not convict Defendant unless she acted 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. See R81, 83; accord Beckering, 2015 
UT App 53, if23 (stating that court reviews "the jury instructions in their 
entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case") ( quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Thus counsel could have reasonably concluded that the 
jury instructions were accurate. 
In sum, Defendant could not show that her counsel unreasonably 
decided not to object to the jury instructions because Instruction 11 tracked 
the elements of the controlling statute and included an element relating to 
Defendant's state of mind, and instruction 10 included the intentional, 
knowing, or reckless mental states. 
But even if counsel's performance were unreasonable, no prejudice 
resulted because Defendant's mental state was never at issue. To 
demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show "that there is a reasonable 
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probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694. Moreover, "proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot 
be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. 
Cook, 870 P.2d 870,877 (Utah 1993). 
Incomplete elements instructions are not invariably prejudicial; 
whether omission of an element of the crime is prejudicial depends on the 
facts of the case. See, e.g., State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ,r,r 48, 51, 82 P.3d 1106 
(holding that an instruction stating that defendant could knowingly commit 
attempted murder, though error, was harmless on the facts of the case); 
State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that 
omitting nonmarriage element from rape instruction was not prejudicial 
where trial facts made clear that defendant and victim were not married). 
Accordingly, Defendant has not shown any harm. To show 
prejudice, Defendant must establish that the facts of her case do not support 
a conviction for witness tampering under a proper instruction. See State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, if24, 994 P.2d 1243. Otherwise-if Defendant would 
have been convicted even under a proper instruction-she suffered no 
prejudice as a result of her lawyer not objecting to the instruction. 
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Here, including the mental states in the elements instruction that 
Defendant alleges were required would have changed nothing because 
Defendant never claimed to have acted other than intentionally. The only 
issue at trial was whether Defendant's request that Cruz change her police 
statement was an attempt to procure false testimony or the truth. 
Defendant admitted that she asked Cruz to change her police statement, i.e., 
had the "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result." R83. Her defense was that Cruz's police report was inaccurate and 
that she asked Cruz to tell the truth. R180:189-90. In closing, counsel 
argued, "If she was trying to get [Cruz] to tell the truth, that's not criminal 
now and it should never be criminal. We should always protect the person 
that's trying to get the other party to tell the truth." R180:231. If Cruz's 
police report were untrue, the state of mind with which Defendant 
attempted to procure the truth was irrelevant. 
Likewise, if the jury believed Cruz's testimony at all, they necessarily 
concluded that Defendant acted intentionally. Cruz testified that Defendant 
asked her to report that Defendant "never hit Josh [Lister]. Josh hit her." 
R180:120. The inference is that Defendant "had the conscious desire" to 
procure false testimony from Cruz. Thus, there is no reasonable probability 
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that including intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in the elements 
instruction would have altered the trial outcome. 
In sum, Defendant is not entitled to review because she invited any 
error in the instructions. Moreover, she could not show ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on June 25, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witness- Receiving or soliciting a bribe 
i.J (1) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with a witness if, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, or with 
the intent to prevent an official proceeding or investigation, he attempts to induce or 
otherwise cause another person to: 
V!J (a) testify or inform false I y; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
( d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been 
summoned. 
~ (2) A person is guilty of the third degree felony of soliciting or receiving a bribe as a 
witness if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his 
doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1). 
(3) The offense of tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe under this 
section does not merge with any other substantive offense committed in the course of 
committing any offense under this section. 
Utah R. App. P. 24. - Briefs 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appro-
priate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(l) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case 
on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel 
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of 
the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(S) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(S)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(a)(S)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the 
appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall 
be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature 
of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, 
shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the 
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is 
arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for re-
viewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request ex-
plicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief umeasonably thick. If the addendum is bound sepa-
rately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall con-
tain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central im-
portance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not 
available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(l) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of 
the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, 
and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the 
response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs 
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The 
content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), 
(3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the 
appellate court. 
( d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and 
oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations 
as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or 
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,1 "the taxpayer," 
etc. 
( e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of 
the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule ll(b) or to pages of any state-
ment of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to 
Rule ll(f) or ll(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts 
shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked 
by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) 
referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. Ref-
erences to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to 
the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and re-
ceived or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not 
exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages 
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) 
of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth 
the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties 
otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file 
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combina-
tion exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(l) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues 
raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant 
and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and 
Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to 
the Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall 
reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the is-
sues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause 
for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the 
brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by 
a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is 
due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of 
the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding 
party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of 
the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be de-
stroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving 
more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of 
the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or 
appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may 
similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant author-
ities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after 
oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine 
copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page 
of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
...;, shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must 
not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited . 
..dJ (k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, pre-
sented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, 
and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24. Motion for New Trial 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new 
trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a sub-
stantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion 
shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of 
the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the 
court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reason-
able. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry of the 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before expiration of the 
time for filing a motion for new trial. 
( d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had 
been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evi-
dence or in argument. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence 
(a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or 
exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and: 
(1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record: 
(A) timely objects or moves to strike; and 
(B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context; or 
(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its substance 
by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context. 
(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the court rules 
definitively on the record--either before or at h·ial--a party need not renew an 
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. 
(c) Court's Statement About the Ruling; Directing an Offer of Proof. The court 
may make any statement about the character or fonn of the evidence, the 
objection made, and the ruling. The court may direct that an offer of proof be 
made in question-and-answer form. 
(d) Preventing the Jury from Hearing Inadmissible Evidence. To the extent 
practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible evidence is 
not suggested to the jury by any means. 
(e) Taking Notice of Plain Error. A court may take notice of a plain error 




Rule 401. Definition Of "Relevant Evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not ad-
missible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion Of Relevant Evidence On Grounds Of Prejudice, Confusion, Or 
Waste Of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
·.~ 
Utah R. Evid. 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Ex-
ceptions; Other Crimes 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted 
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered 
by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim of-
fered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607,608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conform-
ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, 
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible 
to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in 
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a 
sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(3) Rule 404( c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissi-
ble under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury 
in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, 
the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence 
of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the va-
lidity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or state-
ment occurring during the course of the jury1s deliberations or to the effect of an-
ything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to 
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's men-
tal processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the ques-
tion whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
jury1s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the 
juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testi-
fying be received for these purposes. 
Utah R. Evid. 801. Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal 
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
cvJ matter asserted. 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with the declarant1s testimony or the witness denies having made 
the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony 
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of re-
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a 
person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capac-
ity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in 
its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a 
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a cocon-



























Transcript of Jury Trial 3/28/2014 
we can get them to make that arrangement. 
MR. JACKSON: I would also like to address a motion for 
directed verdict, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. They've left the Courtroom. I'll hear 
you with regard to that; although frankly Mr. Jackson I believe 
that the State has made out a prima facie case based on the 
testimony of Ms. Ruiz. The question is whether--you know for 
the trier of fact to determine whether her testimony is 
believable or not, but I'll hear you with regard to that. What 
are we missing in terms of elements of the offense? 
MR. JACKSON: Well I think that the key thing that we're 
missing is that there was no change in the testimony Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, and I listened with interest to that, 
but the elements of the offense are not that there be a change. 
The element is that the defendant believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be 
instituted, or with intent to prevent an official proceeding or 
investigation--now that's her intent--attempted to induce or 
otherwise cause another person. 
There is no such thing as an attempt to commit an attempt 
and so all they have to prove is that she tried to induce or 
cause the other person to testify falsely. They don't have to 
prove that it actually was successful. 
MR. JACKSON: All right. Well I'll submit that. 
THE COURT: So if that's the basis, then the motion for 






























Transcript of Jury Trial 
directed verdict will be denied. 
MR. JACKSON: All right. 
[RECESS.) 
3/28/2014 
BAILIFF: All rise. Court is back in session. You may be 
seated. ~ 
THE COURT: Court is back on the record in State v. 
Plexico. Ms. Plexico is here with her attorney Mr. Jackson and 
Ms. Reid is present representing the State. Do we have our 
technology lined-out? 
MR. JACKSON: Yeah. We've got it ironed-out. So we're 
good to go. 
THE COURT: All right and I guess you're going to re-call 
a witness to lay foundation or is there a stipulation that this 
should come in? 
MR. JACKSON: I'm going to lay the foundation with my 
client who is the person that's being interviewed here. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I guess we can proceed in 
that fashion if that's how you want to proceed. Is there 
anything else we need to address outside the presence of the 
jury. 
MS. REID: Well I don't know if you anticipate getting--I 
don't know if there's going to be another chance for me to bring 
this up, but there are just two things that I do want to 
address. 
I would like you to instruct the jury about the correct 
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Transcript of Jury Trial 3/28/2014 
prejudice them and I think everyone agreed that there would be 
no discussion of that issue. Is that correct? 
MS. REID: Yes. 
THE COURT: Of course if you raise the issue, then you've 
waived that objection, but it's primarily to protect your client 
from the possibility of any prejudice because of that. 
MR. JACKSON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And so we haven't addressed that with the 
jury. My intention is that that would not come up. So you're 
to make sure that your witnesses don't address that issue and if 
you're going to present any videos or recordings of anything 
that happened, that has to be excised because if that issue then 
came in, then based on my ruling that could very well result in 
a mistrial. I would have to think about whether or not I could 
advise the jury and they could be properly instructed, but 
because we didn't address that issue at all in the questioning 
of the jury, in order to assess whether they would be 
appropriate for the case I'm concerned about that. 
Then the next issue is that the concern that the jury is 
going to then become aware that the charges that we~e brought 
against Ms. Plexico were apparently assault and there was a jury 
trial in the justice court and she was acquitted and I had 
indicated that I would not allow evidence with regard to that 
acquittal. Of course if the State presents evidence that would 
make that appropriate, I may very well change my mind, but at 




























Transcript of Jury Trial 3/28/2014 
this point I think the quibble would be on the same standard or 
same level as would a conviction. Had she been convicted I 
would not allow that to come to the jury. 
So I'm not going to allow ~he acquittal because I think it 
would unduly prejudice the jury and so we need to limit what's 
going to go on, what's going to happen with regard to the 
evidence and we're going to need to properly instruct the jury 
and so I think that the State was going to indicate that--they 
were going to present their evidence. Indicate that there was a 
confrontation or a fight of some nature. That as a result of 
that fight the defendant was issued a citation and was aware of 
that citation and that's all really that the State intends to 
offer with regard to that one element; that she was aware of an 
official proceeding and then I would instruct the jury that they 
are not to consider that citation. They're not to consider the 
circumstances that resulted in that citation. They're not to 
speculate about what the result of that was because that's all 
irrelevant. The only issue is whether the evidence is 
sufficient to establish the element of her knowledge of an 
official proceeding being pending. 
Now Mr. Jackson, do you want to make any more of a record 
with regard to that? 
MR. JACKSON: Yeah. I do want to make a record. There 
was provided to us in chambers an additional statement. I'm 
waiving any claim that we may have in terms of needing prior 
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notice to that statement, although I do have the continuing 
objection if this were being introduced with regard to some of 
the language in this thing. 
THE COURT: You object to the introduction of the 
statement because my understanding it does address the abortion 
issue. 
MR. JACKSON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And so you object to its admission and you 
don't intend to admit it, do you? 
MS. REID: No. 
THE COURT: Okay and I suppose it might be used to refresh 
recollection. Anything can be used to refresh recollection, but 
it's not going to come into evidence and we're not going to 
address the abortion issue and you need to discuss that with 
your witnesses and make sure that doesn't come up. 
MR. JACKSON: If it does, I anticipate--I mean it kind of 
depends on the response of the witness as to other parts of it, 
but if I did introduce it, we would probably redact out the 
statement that makes reference to--
THE COURT: And of course you could use it for 
cross-examination if you wanted to use it for cross-examination. 
MR. JACKSON: Then the other concern--well what I request 
and I think the Court was willing to do this, is a cautionary 
written instruction be given in the packet of information that 
will be ultimately submitted to the jury. It wouldn't be the 





























Transcript of Jury Trial 3/28/2014 
original ones that are read, but as part of the packet later on, 
but at the time that the State does introduce their evidence 
with regard to the citation, that the Court give an admonition 
from the bench instructing them that they shouldn't speculate in 
terms of che result of that citation, the conviction or whatever 
or however the Court wishes to word that. 
They shouldn't speculate on that. They can consider the 
fact that that was something that initiated the investigation 
for purposes of this charge, but that deciding whether she was 
guilty or innocent of the assault charge that she was cited for 
is not before this jury to consider. 
THE COURT: And are you okay if I also instruct them that 
they may only consider that in addressing one element of the 
offense; and that is whether or not she had knowledge of an 
official proceeding pending. 
MR. JACKSON: I think if the Court gives that admonition 
as the evidence comes in that will suffice. 
THE COURT: Are you okay with that? ~ 
MS. REID: Yes and just to clarify. There is no objection 
that I would introduce the citation as an exhibit then? 
MR. JACKSON: No. If you want to introduce the citation 
as an exhibit to reflect that that's fine, but I don't want to 
limit myself in not being able to use clip number one that is 
the place where the citation was issued. 
THE COURT: Okay. As long as we avoid the portions that 
Page 101 



























Transcript of Jury Trial 3/28/2014 
are objected to, but you primarily have objections to the video. 
Isn't that right? 
MR. JACKSON: I actually will likely use the video. If 
she wishes to introduce her evidence in such a way to just 
submit the citation, have the officer testify to that, I've got 
no objection to him using the citation. I'm not sure though. 
The problem is that the citation, unless it's time-dated, what 
ends-up happening is the citation is issued like at 10:30 in the 
morning and she's arrested later in the afternoon of the same 
day. So the citation in and of itself may not give what is 
needed in order to establish that prior--
THE COURT: We'll leave that up to the State. 
MR. JACKSON: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right, but you do run the risk that if you 
start presenting some of these videos and you get into areas 
that I've indicated that I'm not going to allow the State to get 
into thaL you, then, have waived any objection--
MR. JACKSON: I understand. 
THE COURT: --and I'll assume that that's a tactical 
decision that you've made, that that's benefits your client more 
than keeping it out. 
MR. JACKSON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. So is there anything else we need 
to address on the motion in limine Mr. Jackson? 
MR. JACKSON: If there is I'll move to exclude the jury 
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and we'll discuss it further. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Reid? 
MS. REID: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right. So make sure you talk to your 
witnesses about that and we'll take a brief recess while I get 
the first eight jury instructions together and then we'll 
proceed. 
MR. JACKSON: Sounds like we're just going to probably get 
through the instructions. Is that what the Court anticipates? 
THE COURT: Pretty close. If we're finished with the 
instructions at ten till, then I'm probably going to have you do 
your opening statements and then we'll recess and then--
MR. JACKSON: All right. So that--
THE COURT: All right? 
MR. JACKSON: Okay. Yeah. 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Court is then in 
recess. 
[RECESS.] 
BAILIFF: All rise. Court is back in session. You may be , 
seated. 
THE COURT: Court is back on the record in State v. 
Plexico. Ms. Plexico is here with her attorney Mr. Jackson. 
Ms. Reid is present representing the State and the jury is back 
in the jury box. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, if any of you have 
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The Court issues this cautionary instruction on how to consider the evidence presented in 
this trial regarding the Defendant's prior acts. The infonnation is provided to the jury to offer 
context and explanation of the circumstances which gave rise to the pending charge. It does not 
establish an essential element of the charge and in fact the Court takes judicial notice that the 
Defendant was acquitted of the charges for which she is now being accused of witness 
tampering. The jury may only consider such evidence in the context of how it may weigh into 
your determination of the guilt or innocence of the Defendant involving the present charge. It 
would be inappropriate for this jury to find the Defendant guilty upon the pending charge 
because one or more members of the jury suspected or believed that the Defendant should have 
been found guilty of the charges for which she was previously acquitted. It is, however, 
appropriate for you to consider these circumstances when determining whether or not the 
Defendant committed the present offense and above all the jury must determine the Defendant's 
guilt or innocence based upon the standard of proof that must be met and which has been 
explained to you through this Court's instruction. 
Addendum E 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
A person is not guilty of a crime unless the person's conduct is prohibited by law and the 
person engages in the conduct with the culpable mental state which is required for that crime. In 
this case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in the alleged criminal conduct and 
that the defendant did so intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect to each element of . 
the crime, as the crime is defined by law. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
---
ii 1$, as charged in the Information, 
the State must prove and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each 
and every one of the following elements: 
1. That Defendant, SHONI PLEXICO, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending; or about to be instituted, or with the intent to 




That the Defendant did attempt to induce or otherwise cause another person to 
Testify or inform fasely; 
That such events occurred on or about August 17, 2013, in Iron County, State 
of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described 
elements, you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of: T AMPERJNG WITH A 
WITNESS, ,a J ), as charged in the Information. If the State has proved, 
however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of: TAMPERING WITH 
A WITNESS, as charged in the Information. 




You are instructed that a person~=in condllct "~~~ngly"; or with "knowledge", 
with respect to his conduct or the circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person ~ "knowingly" or "with 
knowledge", with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct "intentionally" or with "intent", with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to the result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
The Court issues this cautionary instruction on how to consider the evidence presented in 
this trial regarding the Defendant's alleged prior 8:Cts. Th~ info~~~i~n is provided to the jury to 
off er context and explanation of the circumstances which gave rise to the pending charge. It does 
not establish an essential element of the charge. The jury may only consider such evidence in the 
context of how it may weigh into your detennination of the guilt or innocence of the Defendant 
involving the present charge. It would be inappropriate for this jury to find the Defendant guilty 
upon the pending charge because one or more members of the jury suspected or believed that the 
Defendant should have been found guilty of the charges for which she was initially cited. You 
are instructed that you shall not speculate about what resulted from that initial citation. It is, 
however, appropriate for you to consider these circumstances when determining whether or not 
the Defendant committed the present offense and above all the jucy must determine the 
Defendant's guilt or innocence based upon the standard of proof that must be met and which has 
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COUNTY OF IRON ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE SCOTT 
FLETCHER 
Case No. 131500464 
Judge: Keith C. Barnes 
I, EUGENE SCOTT FLETCHER, having been first duly sworn depose and state as 
follows: 
l. I make this affidavit based upon on my own personal knowledge, information and 
belief and not acting under the undue influence of any person or thing. 
2. I served as a member of the jury in the case of State of Utah v. Shoni Plexico, criminal 
number 131500464. In the end, I was the only juror pressing for not guilty with the other seven 
members, deliberating for nearly four hours late into the evening. Although I ultimately returned 
a verdict of guilty on the charge of witness tampering, a third degree felony, I immediately 
regretted that decision. I was upset about the verdict and at myself for not maintaining my 
, + ~ 
conviction that the Defendant was not guilty and after a restless night I contacted my brother 
who is an attorney to see what I could do about it. He told me that I might be able to help her 
attorney challenge the conviction. I was tempted to call the Defendant's attorney but I did not. 
3. After having a chance to sleep on it, revive my senses and revisit what had transpired 
the previous day during deliberation, I became more fully convinced that my concerns were not 
as completely unfounded as they were being treated by the foreperson and that by succumbing to 
the pressure to be "reasonable", willing to question my point of view in order to achieve a 
consensus and to allow everyone to be excused and go home, I realized I had done both myself 
and the Defendant a grave disservice, giving into that pressure. 
4. I believe that the verdict in this case was a mistake for several reasons. These include Q 
those I have identified herein which have bothered me continuously since that time. I feel that 
the verdict was the product of incomplete and misleading information, derived from inaccurate 
assumptions as to Miss Plexico's guilt on the underlying charges and past criminal history. It was 
the result of undue influence and factors we, as jurors, considered outside the scope of our 
instruction and the evidence presented at trial. 
5. I also believe that the presentation of evidence with certain signficant omissions only 
served to confuse us on critical points of proof, making us unsure of the amount of weight to 
give to what should have been the more essential factors to be considered. 
6. When I was contacted by Defendant's attorney, I was relieved and eager for the chance 
to formally express my concerns and I do so now by this affidavit. 
7. There were many occurrences that troubled me about the process from the onset. I felt ~ 
as though my efforts had been undermined when I later discovered that the Defendant, Miss 
Plexico, was acquitted on the underlying charges of assault. I fail to understand how we were 
', •; 
-~ 
expected to be able to establish the truth of guilty or not guilty and live with the responsibility of 
having convicted someone with a felony when what seems to me to be crucial and essential 
information was not provided to us at trial. 
8. The instruction we received from the Court was simply not to consider what happened 
concerning the underlying charges which left the others believing and myself questioning 
whether or not she was guilty of "the assault". A vital and substantial part of our deliberation 
focused upon the assumption put forth by the foreperson that the Defendant was guilty of the 
underlying charges. Had I known that the Defendant was acquitted of the charges of assault, I 
never would have agreed to convict her of witness tampering and I suspect that others serving on 
the jury would have felt the same and likely returned a verdict of not guilty. 
9. Even though we were instructed to disregard what happened in the prior trial, this was 
not disregarded but became the most critical factor for all in ultimately deciding to find the 
Defendant guilty of the charges, manifesting itself in different ways during our deliberation. The 
foreperson was the one most expressly convinced of Miss Plexico's guilt, citing as her proof of 
certainty Miss Plexico's body language. The assumption of her guilt on the assault charges 
played into reinforcing her belief that these indicators weighed in favor of the Defendant's guilt 
and not her innocence. 
I 0. Additionally, another juror's negative opinion of Miss Plexico was express by stating 
that she was "no angel", the speculation deriving from the conversation taking place between the 
Officer and the Defendant when she was arrested where she asked the Officer if she was being 
charged with a class A or a class B misdemeanor. The Defendant asking such a question seemed 
to corroborate that juror's belief that Miss Plexico had a prior criminal history and therefore this 
comment weighed in favor of her being guilty of the charge we were considering as opposed to 
,, .. 
her being innocent. In light of these discussions, it became apparent to me that our deliberation 
upon whether Miss Plexico was guilty or not of the charge of witness tampering had more to do 
with her perceived tainted character than the actual facts of the case. 
11. The position presented by the foreperson as to who we should believe was lying and 
who was telling the truth in her mind came down to three things: 
(a) Her view that Miss Plexico had been caught in a lie when confronted by Officer 
Triplett, denying the accusation of assault (this of course based upon her incorrect assumption 
that the Defendant was found guilty of assault); 
(b) The female victim never changed her version of the facts while testifying, (a 
conclusion reached even though defense counsel was limited in cross-examination by the Court); Q 
and 
(c) The statements of the victims were consistent (this assumption was made despite the 
fact that they were never introduced as evidence at trial). 
12. I believe that the foreperson's assumption of Miss Plexico's guilt would have not 
carried as much weight with the other jurors notwithstanding her experience and schooling in 
criminal forensics, her unflinching sureness of the Defendant's guilt, and her position as 
foreperson, had we been informed of the fact that the Defendant was found not guilty of the 
underlying charges. Not knowing the truth of the matter bolstered one juror's argument and the 
inaccurate assumptions drawn therefrom, that the Defendant likely had a criminal history and 
therefore was definitely guilty of the crime leading up to the charge before us, suggesting that 
our return of a guilty verdict would be an appropriate means of intervention, to keep her from 
more serious assaults towards others in the future. In other words, she viewed conviction as a 
means to help her recover from these prior crimes we assumed she had committed. This 
discussion only made sense in the context of considering what we should do to prevent her from 
future criminal misconduct by us assuming that the Defendant had in fact committed the 
underlying offenses. 
13. It was this fundamental assumption that led the foreperson to believe from her 
observation that the Defendant was not telling the truth because she nodded her head when 
disputing a claim and shook her head side to side when claiming to tell the truth and the 
Defendant looking out the window of the squad car silently after giving up defending herself as 
obvious examples of someone who was lying. Moreover, the trial court judge was sustaining the 
objections of the State when defense counsel was attempting to cross-examine the female victim 
on matters concerning the previous trial, restricting any challenge as to the consistency of her 
previous statements which led us to believe that the victim had stuck to her story. 
14. Frankly, I was disheartened by the fact that the foreperson was the primary one that 
did not do as we were instructed at the beginning in that she entrenched herself in deciding that 
the Defendant was guilty and refused to consider any argument or position to the contrary. She 
was often dismissive of my argument and opinion by making outward displays of scoffing, 
rolling her eyes, pushing her chair back, putting her hands on her head as if in astonishment and 
to make it clear to the others that she was in complete and utter disbelief in how I could even 
espouse such an opposing position. This display coming from someone with supposed added 
knowledge and experience in legal matters may have also been a factor in others abandoning 
their initial position of believing the Defendant was not guilty. 
1 5. Upon reflection, it is my belief and realization now that much of what the foreperson 
and others convinced us to rely upon in terms of who was telling the truth and who was not, 
involved factors we should not have considered, they being outside the scope of that which we 
had been instructed and the facts of the case. These factors turned out to be essential in deciding 
upon the guilt of Miss Plexico, which in the case of assuming that she was guilty, were false, and 
regarding the assumptions that the Defendant had a past criminal history, were mistakenly based 
upon unfounded speculation. 
16. The deliberation process itself took a physical toll upon me. I had very little sleep the 
previous night due to a chronic bronchial condition from which the coughing kept me awake. I 
thought I would be excused when interviewed because I did not think I had the focus necessary 
to ferret out the truth but I was never interviewed so I decided I would do my best. By the end of 
the presentation of evidence, I was feeling the effects of fatigue caused by my sleepless night. 
The room we were in became increasingly stuffy, warm and sweaty as contention within the 
room became more poignant. I was not as sharp in my thinking as normal and I did not realize 
until later that finding reasonable doubt which I believe was clearly established was less of a 
standard than finding it was more probable than not that the Defendant was innocent. 
1 7. While the Court provided us with something to eat, I was so distraught over the sharp 
contention that occurred during deliberation that I had no appetite and therefore I did not eat. By 
the end of the process, I felt as though I was mentally spent, physically exhausted, unsettled and 
unconvinced, willing to give in, in part due to my sympathy for the other jurors who appeared to 
be also suffering from the heat and from fatigue and repeatedly asked me to abandon my stance 
and accept their obvious verdict, guilty, even though it was commonly believed that the charges 
were excessive ~ompared to the alleged offense, so we could be excused and the taxpayers 
money not be further wasted. In the end, this combined with being instructed by the Judge to 
disregard the testimony about the uiterior motives behind the initial assault charges, testimony 
which raised the greatest doubts for me about the truthfulness of the assault charges, ultimately 
weakened my resolve. 
18. It has now been several weeks since deliberating in the case and I stand even more 
convinced that the Defendant, SHONI PLEXICO, was found guilty not from the facts of the case 
but from assumptions, information, inferences and circumstances that arose inappropriately 
during deliberation. I am disappointed in myself that I lost sight of the State's need to convict 
beyond a reasonable doubt until after it was too late but it unsettles me even more to realize that 
with everything that was discussed during deliberation, the subject of reasonable doubt was not 
argued or considered by any ofus during the final stages of the process. I believe that there was 
reasonable doubt and it bothers me now to reflect upon the fact that no one in the jury room 
realized that reasonable doubt was the factor that we should have been focused upon rather than 
those that we considered in weighing the evidence. 
19. I feel that our verdict of guilty was not proper and did not reflect the weight of the 
evidence presented at trial or the proper application of the Court's instruction and to the extent I 
am allowed to do so now, I recant my vote on the verdict of guilty and replace it my vote of a 
verdict of not guilty. 
FURTHER AS AFFIANT I SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2014. 
/s/ Eugene Scott Fletcher 
EUGENE SCOTT FLETCHER, 
Juror 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23 rd day of May. 201..1. 
/s/ Sharon Drabeck, Commission #667727 
NOTARY PUBLIC, State of Utah 
My commission expires on August 1, 2017. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. That's correct, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. There's no reference in that statement about what 
you've got in this statement, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right and that happened at 9:00, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. So at any rate you show up. You go to--she shows up 
at your house. Was there ever any conversation that you recall 
of her basically telling you to be honest about the statement? 
A. No. 
Q. She never said anything about being honest? 
A. Nope. 
Q. Had you been honest about the previous statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Completely honest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You put everything in that statement that occurred in 
that event, right? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because it wasn't like a really big problem to put it 
in my statement. 
Q. What was the problem? 
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A. Well that there was a gun involved in the assault 
charge or whatever. The day of the incident there was a gun 
involved. 
Q. In other words you and Josh had made a statement 
claiming that Shoni had assaulted you, but had failed to mention 
the fact that there was a gun involved, right? 
MS. REID: Your Honor can I object and approach? 
THE COURT: Yeah you can approach. 
[Conversation at bench.] 
MS. REID: He's looking to go into it and she's going to 
(inaudible] portions. 
THE COURT: Well this is exactly what I was concerned 
about is collateral impeachment. 
MR. JACKSON: [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Well I understand that. I understand that, 
but let's say last week she had said somebody asked her what 
time is it and she said it was 5:00 and it was 4:00. She lied, 
but that's not the kind of impeachment we're dealing with. In 
the other case, if she made some false statements that related 
to the other case, it's not relevant. It's a collateral 
impeachment. We could go on all day about things that she may 
have said that weren't true in the past. 
MR. JACKSON: The problem is that my client has testified 
that she was there to get her belongings. [inaudible] 
THE COURT: And if your client, if you want her to testify 
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that she told her to be honest, then that's not a problem, but 
if you're going to try to impeach this witness with a statement 
that she made that you think you're now going to be able to 
contradict something that she said earlier in the day that has 
nothing to do with this particular charge, I believe that's 
collateral impeachment and I'll sustain the objection, but you 
can make your record if you'd like. 
MR. JACKSON: I want to make a record Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So can we excuse the jury and then go through 
that? All right. 
[Tape goes blank here for a few seconds.) 
THE COURT: --going to take some time. So I'm going to 
excuse you and let you go into the jury room for a few minutes. 
Again, in this and every other break in the trial, don't discuss 
the case with anyone or among yourselves. Don't allow anyone to 
discuss the case in your presence. Do not talk to or 
comrnunicate with me or any of the participants in the trial. If 
you would go with the Bailiff now in the jury room and hopefully 
we can take care of this right now. 
MS. CRUZ: Do you want me to go? 
THE COURT: No. You stay where you're at. 
MS. CRUZ: Awesome. 
[Jury leaves the Courtroom.] 
THE COURT: All right. The jury has left the Courtroom 
and I had indicated to you earlier Mr. Jackson ~hat I wasn't 
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going to allow collateral impeachment. You've now suggested 
that the reason that this may be relevant is not just to 
impeach, but also to provide a little bit more background with 
regard to why your client went over there and what she told her 
to say and that that's why that might be relevant. 
MR. JACKSON: Yes Your Honor. In fact I just want to 
indicate normally in a case like this we would not be severing 
the witness tampering charge from the underlying offenses. So 
the jury basically would have the perspective of the entire 
thing and what we're doing here is we're basically trying to 
pick and choose what the jury should hear and what they 
shouldn't hear and I'm deprived of the opportunity basically to 
let the jury be aware of what had transpired that led up to my 
client now going over to her house because there's going to be a 
difference in terms of the testimony with regard to whether 
she's claiming that my client was basically saying that she told 
her to lie or to tell the truth, to tell the whole truth, which 
she acknowledges on the witness stand she didn't do. 
Now the circumstances are pretty evident and you know 
there's some issues there. The reason why is because it 
involved the use of a handgun. We discussed this in chambers. 
The reality of it is these people that chose basically to file a 
report against my client not because they had been assaulted, 
but because they basically--in other words they didn't report 
this as an incident that took place. They picked and choosed 
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deciding what they wanted to report and then at the same time, 
when we questioned them about that in the last case, that became 
obvious to everybody that they basically were abusing the 
process. That's really what's going on here. 
Witness tampering is all wrapped-up in their misuse of the 
process to bring false charges against my client regarding 
assault. 
THE COURT: Let's assume that I buy your argument and I 
allow you then to go into what was said and why your client 
would do what she did and bring her over and all of that. I'm 
still not going to let you present any evidence with regard to 
what happened in the Justice Court. If you open that door, chen 
the jury is going to be wondering well gee. I wonder what 
happened with that and I'm going to instruct them you can't 
consider that because I'm not going to let the jury know that 
she was acquitted in the justice court just like I would not let 
the jury know that she had been convicted. 
MR. JACKSON: Well then I think we need to modify the 
instruction that basically says that you can't consider whether 
a witness is telling the truth or not by the way they testify 
because that 1 s what we 1 re doing. 
THE COURT: No. We're not at that point. What we can say 
is if your client has a--if she wants--and quite frankly I don't 
think that the jury is going to be asked to decide whether this 
witness had testified truthfully in regard to the assault 
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charge, but you can offer that as a defense to say that's why 
your client went over to talk to her because she believed she 
was saying things that weren't true and then the jury can sort 
that all out, bu~ I am not going to allow the acquittal in the 
Justice Court to be presented to this jury. That would unfairly 
prejudice the State. Not going to happen. 
So if you want to open the door and you want to present 
all this evidence about what happened and what was aid and all 
of that stuff, I will instruct the jury you are not to consider 
what happened at that time for any other purpose other than as 
background for what happened at Ms. Cruz' apartment when your 
client came over and talked to her and I'll go that direction. 
MR. JACKSON: What it constitutes is an inconsistent 
statement as to what she is testifying to here today. 
THE COURT: But I've already told you that's collateral. 
I'm not going to allow that to be presented solely for the 
purpose of impeaching her. It would be the same thing as I've 
already indicated to you if three days ago she had told a lie 
and the lie had nothing to do with this particular case. 
MR. JACKSON: It wasn't three days ago. It was the--
THE COURT: But what I'm saying is that that's collateral 
impeachment, but when you present it to me here at the bench, I 
was suggested a reason that it might very well be relevant and 
that is that your client didn'~ go over to tell her a lie, but 
went over to tell her tell the truth. Tell what really happened 
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and then explained to her what she wanted her to say because 
that's what really happened and that may very well be an 
appropriate defense, but the jury is going to be instructed ~hat 
they are not to consider the facts or the circumstances of ~hat 
conflict except to the extent as it relates to what your client 
may have said when she approached this witness, but we're not 
going to get into the acquittal. I am absolutely not going to 
allow that. 
MR. JACKSON: And I understand you're not going to get 
into the acquittal, but this is the reason why I've reserved 
talking to the jury. I don't really know what to tell the jury. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. JACKSON: I don't really--you basically you've tied my 
hands to the point to where I can't present a proper defense. I 
cannot effectively represent my client because I don't know what 
I'm allowed to basically present based upon what the Court has 
ruled here. I mean we're talking about conversations that took 
place the very day that she's arrested that gave rise to the 
charges and what not and we're talking about her testimony from 
a prior event that took place that's likely to be inconsistent 
with what she's going to testify here today. 
THE COURT: And I told you that because that is offered 
for some purpose other than simply collateral impeachment, I'll 
allow that, but I'm not going to allow you to then ask what 
happened in the justice court. I will instruct the jury that 
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that is irrelevant. It doesn't matter what happened in the 
justice court because as soon as you present evidence that 
something happened in the justice court, now this jury is going 
to be asked to determine whether the justice court jury believed 
or didn't believe Ms. Ruiz and they're essentially offering an 
opinion on her truthfulness and that is absolutely prohibited. 
There's a whole line of authority that I couldn't have a 
witness come in and testify about whether she's telling the 
truth. I'm not going to have a jury come in and offer testimony 
when I have no idea why they reached the verdict that they did 
and obviously it would be argued, if I were you in your position 
and that were to come in, I would argue that they said she's a 
liar and you should too and that ain't going to happen. That is 
not going to happen in this trial today. 
MR. JACKSON: I'm not interested in what conclusion came 
out of that trial. I am interested in the fact that her 
testimony is inconsistent or her testimony may be inconsistent 
with what she has previously testified to. 
THE COURT: You can offer that. You can offer that and 
once we open that door and we consider all this testimony about 
what was said in the morning because I determine that it's 
somehow relevant to what your client told her, then I think we 
can probably get into that testimony. 
MR. JACKSON: All right. Well what I think I can probably 
do then is I think I'll reserve the rest of my cross-exam. Well 
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I'll complete my cross-exam and reserve the right to re-call her 
as part of my case. 
THE COURT: Okay you can, but you understand that my 
ruling is--
MR. JACKSON: I understand. 
THE COURT: --that if you want to open that door and go 
into the facts and circumstances because you think it's relevant 
to what your client then told her to do when she came over to 
her place later in the day, I'll allow that. That may very well 
have some relevance and I'll allow it, but I'm also going to 
instruct the jury that that has nothing to do with the weather 
or--well, the outcome of that case has nothing to do with this 
case. 
MR. JACKSON: I think I've got a way that I can proceed 
and I'll do it that way. 
THE COURT: Okay and Ms. Reid I haven't allowed you to 
make any statement at all. 
MS. REID: Right. Well I feel like I'm in as much of a 
disadvantage as Mr. Jackson is and essentially I've given my 
witness a gag order. I told her we've got to stay away from 
these very hot button issues and then Mr. Jackson gets her on 
the stand and says are you telling the whole story? Well no. 
I'm not. The reason why she's not is because she can't tell the 
whole story. There's another story about the abortion and the 
baby dying and everything else and that conversation happened. 
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THE COURT: Well that abortion issue though has nothing to 1' 
do with this. 
MS. REID: No, but what I'm saying is so when he asks her 
are you telling me everything that happened that day and 
everything that was said and she says no, it's because it's 
true. She's not telling everything that was discussed that day. 
She's leaving out what I told her to. I told her to steer 
clear of the assault charge and it being brought to Court and 
steer clear of the abortion issue. So that prejudiced my client 
and my case because that makes it seem like she's lying. 
THE COURT: And of course on re-direct you can ask her 
about that and ask her if there were some things she was 
instructed not to talk about and then if--
MS. REID: Right. I just--yeah. 
THE COURT: So if there are other issues, other things 
that happened that weren't addressed and she can simply say yes, 
but I still don't want you to go into those issues. 
MS. REID: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay? 
MS. REID: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right Mr. Jackson are we okay then 
proceeding? 
MR. JACKSON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: So you want to conduct some more 
cross-examination? 
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MR. JACKSON: Yeah. I've got just a couple more 
questions. Then I'll--
3/28/2014 
THE COURT: All right. Let's bring the j~ry back in then. 
[Jury enters the Cou~troom.] 
THE COURT: All right. Everybody can be seated thank you. 
The jury is back in the Courtroom. Ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury, if any of you violated the admonition that I gave you 
before last recess, please raise your hand. No one has raised 
their hand. Mr. Jackson you may resume your cross-examination 
along the guidelines that we discussed. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MS. CRUZ CONTINUED 
BY MR. JACKSON: 
Q. It's true, isn't it Ruth, that you at no time changed 
your statement? No matter what Shoni said to you, you've stuck 
with this statement from first to last? 
A. Yep. 
Q. You in fact told her right at that moment you wouldn't 
do it? 
A. Right. 
Q. She didn't do anything to you to try to influence you 
in any way other than to ask you for a favor? 
A. Well she just kept begging me. She was saying please 
if I could change the story. 
Q. So now there was more than one conversation? 
A. Well it was the same conversation and she was just 
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